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a b s t r a c t 
Psychologists among other behavioural scientists refer to the tendency of favouring, inter- 
preting, and searching for information that supports one’s prior beliefs as confirmation bias . 
Given the relevance of the topic to the field, we develop a small-scale agent-based model 
in discrete-time to investigate how employment conditions affect attitudes towards climate 
policies under such a cognitive bias. Our narrative resembles the so-called discrete-choice 
approach. It is assumed that the respective probability functions respond to variations in 
the employment rate. Persistent endogenous fluctuations might emerge via a super-critical 
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Furthermore, depending on the strength of agents’ response 
to the collective opinion, we might have coexistence of periodic attractors as a represen- 
tation of path dependence. In terms of policy implications, we highlight that the adoption 
of a successful green-agenda depends on the ability of policy-makers to take advantage of 
favourable conditions in the labour market while appealing to different framing strategies. 







Behavioural scholars have identified the tendency to select information that seems to confirm prior opinions as one of 
the most problematic aspects of human reasoning. While initial beliefs become less relevant as evidence accumulates –
a process known as “washing-out the priors” – individuals affected by confirmation bias tend to favour information that 
supports their personal opinions. Although there is an evolutionary justification for the existence of such a mechanism, 
it consists in a failure of the Bayesian updating of beliefs that has significant negative effects on the proper functioning
of political systems ( Lockwood, 2016 ), financial markets (e.g. Rabin and Schrag, 1999; Pouget et al., 2017 ), and society in
general (for a comprehensive assessment, see Nickerson, 1998 ). 
To the extent that climate change is also a social phenomenon (see Hackmann et al., 2014; Pearson et al., 2016 ), a relevant
research question consists in understanding the role of such a bias when investigating the respective trends in international 
public opinion. As shown by Capstick et al. (2015) , despite the scientific evidence on climate change, the general public
seems to be divided between those who believe and those who are not convinced there is an environmental challenge∗ Corresponding author. 
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(see also Bliuc et al., 2015 ; for a comparison between attitudes in the general public and scientific circles, see Savin et al.,
2021 ). Polarisation of opinions is dangerous in this case because successful policy implementation requires a certain degree 
of acceptance capable of delivering sustainable long-run results. 
The costs associated with anthropogenic climate change increase the demand for insurance ( Botzen and van den 
Bergh, 2012 ). This means that the implementation of a green-agenda is strongly related to the performance of the labour
market. There is some evidence indicating that recessions negatively affect attitudes towards climate policies in the United 
States (US) and in Europe (as in Scruggs and Benegal, 2012 ; Shum, 2012 ). In this paper, it is our purpose to go one step fur-
ther and investigate the interaction between individuals’ prior beliefs and employment dynamics. We develop a small-scale 
agent-based model to study how employment conditions affect environmental attitudes under confirmation bias . To the best 
of our knowledge, we are the first to attempt to provide a formal assessment of this relationship. 1 
Our contribution relates to an emerging literature on macroeconomic ecological sentiment analysis (e.g. 
Antoci et al., 2012 ; Dávila-Fernández and Sordi, 2020 ; Rengs et al., 2020 ; for a review see Ciarli and Savona, 2019 ).
In this way, we do not assume that agents are rational in the conventional sense. Instead, we adopt the notion of procedural
rationality, which allows us to investigate the interaction between different heuristics as part of decision-making processes. 
Following Gowdy (2008) , we recognise that assessing climate change requires a proper reference to social context. However, 
differently from previous efforts, we highlight the role and implications of the confirmation bias . It is shown that persistent
endogenous fluctuations might emerge via a super-critical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Furthermore, depending on individ- 
uals’ response to collective opinion, we might have coexistence of periodic attractors. The latter stands as a representation 
of path dependence given that time-trajectories are sensible to initial conditions. 
In terms of policy implications, our analysis indicates that the adoption of a successful green-agenda depends on the 
ability of policy makers to take advantage of favourable employment rates. This requires the understanding and use of 
different framing strategies. Given that confirmation bias is a problematic aspect of human reasoning but also seems to be an
intrinsic part of being human, we should learn how to take advantage of it. Such a recommendation goes hand in hand with
evidence indicating that bias effects might be dodged by emphasising the gains of climate change mitigation (e.g. Spence and
Pidgeon, 2010; Feldman, 2018 ). Moreover, we highlight that more important than employment levels, policy makers should 
act when employment is increasing. Even though the trajectories we obtain are related to long-term processes of structural 
and institutional change, endogenous fluctuations might be used as a path towards a more desirable green-equilibrium. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next Section, we develop a small-scale agent-based model 
in discrete-time that allows for some degree of confirmation bias in the formation of attitudes towards climate policies. In 
Section 3 , we introduce a “group effect” allowing agents to be decisively influenced by social context. Numerical simulations 
are performed showing the robustness of our results as well as their sensitivity to different scenarios. We conclude with 
some final considerations. 
2. A model of green confirmation bias 
Climate change is not perceived in the same way by different people and polarisation in public opinion obstructs the im-
plementation of green public policies. Thus, it is important to understand how individuals with opposite attitudes towards 
climate issues interact without ignoring basic elements that are part of human cognition. Research on cultural psychology 
indicates that opinions about climate risk are not always based upon scientific evidence. Interpretations of scientific infor- 
mation on unknown phenomena are motivated by competing cultural philosophies or worldviews ( Kahan et al., 2011, 2012 ).
Reasoning at the individual level is context-dependent, leading to inevitable group behaviour effects. This results in agents 
engaging in motivated reasoning , also implying that they might have different mental goals ( Druckman and McGrath, 2019 ). 
On the other hand, individuals may aim to arrive at certain or predetermined conclusions, confirming a prior belief 
related to politics, religion or factors related to a certain life-style. This mechanism is characterised by several biases that 
lead to a mistaken interpretation of available information, causing a divergence of sentiments. The interaction between 
people who interpret evidence conditioned by existing beliefs or a pre-determined conclusion, i.e. affected by confirmation 
bias , results in complex attitudes towards climate policies at the individual and collective levels. From a dynamic point of
view, it introduces an inertial component into the system given that agents do not change their views immediately after 
confronted with new evidence. 
The importance of this issue to our understanding of different aspects of social cohesion has been recently highlighted 
in an agent-based framework by scholars such as Sobkowicz (2018) and Konc and Savin (2019) . Having greenhouse gas mit-
igation practices as general benchmark and applying tools from network theory, the latter modelled weighted interactions 
among agents that depend on the similarity in preferences. It is demonstrated that the introduction of the bias changes the
ranking of networks in terms of the diffusion rates they achieve. One should notice, however, that their analysis does not
contemplate the existence of feedback effects from specific economic variables to agents’ attitudes. In this Section, it is our 1 Agents, heterogeneity, and interactions are key concepts in multidisciplinary approaches. It is difficult to strictly classify and compare agent-based 
analysis in economics. Following the detailed survey presented in Dilaver et al. (2018) , we identify the switching strategy type of models as part of this 
literature (e.g. Brock and Hommes, 1997 ). Our contribution relates to such an approach and, throughout the paper, we shall refer to it as a small-scale 
agent-based model. A review of climate-energy policies using agent-based models can be found in Castro et al., 2020 . 
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purpose to provide a parsimonious formal narrative that considers the presence of such a cognitive bias in the interplay 
between the (macro)economy and the environment. 
2.1. Attitudes towards green policies 
Suppose labour force is equal to population, N, the latter being constant and divided between people who are climate 
change supporters, N + , and those who are climate-change deniers, N −: 
N = N + t + N −t (1) 
The difference between these two groups is indicated with n : 
n t = N + t − N −t (2) 
We introduce an index to define the average attitude of society towards environmental regulation: 
t = n t 
N 
(3) 
where  ∈ [ −1 , 1] . If, in a certain period, all citizens are climate supporters, then  = 1 . On the other hand, if they are all
climate change deniers,  = −1 . When agents are equally split between the two groups,  = 0 . 
Fiedler (20 0 0) has documented a series of judgement biases when it comes to ecological thinking. They range from base-
rate neglect to illusory correlation, being strongly related to the existence of a confirmation bias . Consequently, the way a
narrative is framed influences how individuals acquire information ( Jones and Sudgen, 2001 ) as well as cognitively organise
concepts ( Jones and Song, 2014 ). To keep our exercise as simple as possible, we assume that in every period individuals
may update their beliefs in a biased way. Environmentally friendly agents are likely to adjust their expectations attributing 
different im portance to facts that support their initial guess rather than news that goes in the opposite direction. On the
other hand, those who do not consider global warming a priority may give more weight to information that minimises the
problem. 
Define α as the share of agents that are willing to change their view in a given period. A high value of this parameter
indicates that a large part of the population is willing to reconsider its position regarding the environment when confronted 
with new information. On the contrary, a low α reflects a state of affairs in which individuals have “made their minds” and
nothing can make them change their believes. Hence, the strength of the confirmation bias , 1 − α, is such that the fraction
of agents supporting and opposing environmental policies is given by: 
N + t 
N 











where p + and p − are the probability functions of having a positive or a negative attitude, respectively, and the composition
of the population is conditional to the degree of the bias. As we shall argue in what follows, they depend on a set of
explanatory variables that are likely to include other psychological elements as well as economic indicators. Notice that the 
closer α is to zero, the higher the bias. When α = 0 , agents just repeat their beliefs of the previous period, being resistant
to the possibility of changing attitudes. 
Changes in the number of environmentally friendly individuals are conditional upon the probability of adopting a pro- or 
anti-environmental position. In Eq. (4) , subtracting the second expression from the first, we obtain the aggregate attitudes 
index as a function of the confirmation bias: 
t = α
(
p + t−1 − p −t−1 
)
+ ( 1 − α) t−1 (5) 
This structure resembles Hommes et al. (2005) discrete choice approach with asynchronous updating. 2 The reader might 
also find similarities with the so-called logit dynamics in evolutionary game theory. Notice that when there is no bias, i.e.
α = 1 ,  only depends on p + and p −. 
As argued at the beginning of this paper, the presence of confirmation bias introduces an inertial component at the 
individual level so that agents would change their minds less often than in the absence of such mechanism. Every period, a
certain number of individuals adopts either a positive or a negative approach to climate change. Evidence seems to suggest 
that, during good times, people care more about environmental issues whereas, when the economy is in a recession and 
unemployment is increasing, they tend to concentrate on more urgent needs (e.g. Scruggs and Benegal, 2012 ; Shum, 2012 ).
It is quite intuitive that a household facing rising unemployment risk is more concerned about paying rent and buying 2 Going back to its roots, one should refer to the influential paper by Brock and Hommes (1997) . For a deeper discussion on possible alternative specifi- 
cations, see Franke and Westerhoff (2017) . The two main mechanisms in this literature are the discrete choice and the transition probability approach. In 
their simplest forms, agents face a binary decision and commit conditional to a set of probabilities. The model developed in this paper is in discrete-time, 
but analogous results can be derived in a continuous set-up. 
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food than with the prospects of ecological costs that are not daily visible (see, for example, the literature reviewed by
Hurst et al., 2013 ). 
Some social scientists have even suggested that it is possible to compare environmental protection to a luxury good: 
the topic seems to be very attractive but it is immediately set aside during recessions or periods of stagnation (e.g. Abou-
Chadi and Kayser, 2017 ). Such line of argument has similarities with the so-called “basic needs hierarchy” according to which 
humans only begin to pursue other goals once basic physiological needs, such as physical safety and access to food, have
been taken care of (for a discussion, see Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008 ). Moreover, during economic contractions, there is 
some evidence indicating that the media give more weight to macroeconomic issues, reinforcing the perception that envi- 
ronmental degradation is a slow and non-immediate problem ( Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002 ; Carmichael and Brulle, 2017 ). 
We are still left with the task of determining what is the most appropriate variable to capture our previous discussion. A
natural candidate is the level of economic activity. Given that this paper develops a growth model, we could think in terms
of the rate of growth of output, or fluctuations with respect to some sort of long-run trend. Another possibility is the rate of
employment, e , or again, deviations from its steady-state value. In order to explicitly take into account the dynamics of the
labour market, we acknowledge the need of relying on an indicator that captures employment conditions. However, using e 
in levels seems to us somehow unsatisfactory because the perception that things are improving (or not) depends more on 
the direction of the movement rather than on the present state of affairs per se . Even if unemployment rates are very low
but increasing, there is a change in perceptions that one should be able to formally assess. 
Moreover, as we will show in the next Section, our model is compatible with multiple equilibrium points and persistent 
endogenous fluctuations, including the coexistence of periodic attractors. This means that for a bounded rational agent is not 
feasible to know a priori the “right” equilibrium value of the employment rate. In this context, an increasing or decreasing 
e are more likely to influence the dynamics of sentiments. In addition, it is well established in the labour market literature
that the employment rate fluctuates more than other labour market indicators. Shimer (2005) for instance, finds that the 
volatility of the labour market tightness, i.e. the vacancy-unemployment ratio, in the US is around twenty times larger than 
the standard deviation of the real wage rates and labour productivity over the past thirty years. Two possibilities remain. 
Either to use variations of e in levels, or instead to rely in the respective rate of change. To simplify the algebraic steps and
mathematical demonstrations, we chose the latter. Hence, suppose: 










































e t −e t−1 
e t−1 
))
where β > 0 captures the response of the probability functions to changes in the employment rate. The discrete-choice 
approach refers to this parameter as the intensity of choice. When its is close to zero, the two probabilities are nearly equal.
On the other hand, when it is very large and tends to infinity, the two probabilities tend to 1 and 0, respectively. In this
way, p + increases with employment while p − presents the opposite behaviour. 
2.2. Environmental regulation 
The literature on the relationship between private costs and social benefits is quite controversial. This is not different 
when it comes to tackling climate change, with a prevailing belief that there is a trade-off between the two dimensions.
However, at the mid-1990s, Porter and van der Linde (1995) suggested that environmental regulation might potentially 
increase firms’ competitiveness by changing the prevailing structure of incentives. If pollution is seen as resulting from an 
incomplete or inefficient utilisation of resources, strict environmental regulation could actually encourage innovation and 
induce efficiency. 
In recent decades, the so-called Porter hypothesis (PH) has been discussed in at least three different versions. Some 
scholars have argued that any kind of regulation can induce innovation. Others have indicated that only certain types of 
innovation are fostered by regulation. A last group of contributions refers to a narrow PH in which only certain types of
regulation stimulate innovation. Fabrizi et al. (2018) have provided a recent survey of the field and show that there is some
empirical evidence supporting only the last two versions. In this paper, we accept the validity of PH. Define Z as a measure
of environmental efficiency, for example, the amount of output per unit of Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. The degree of
stringency of regulation is supposed to be captured by λ. However, efficiency conditions today are linked to the cumulative 
effects of past decisions. This means that Z not only depends on λ in period t , but also on the regulation adopted over a
certain time-horizon, η. In mathematical terms: 




1 + fλη−1 
)
(7) 
where f > 0 captures the efficiency of the regulation. 570 














In reality, aspects related to the design of policy and regulations play a crucial role in the determination of efficiency con-
ditions. While for the moment we abstract from a more detailed description of the channels involved in implementing and 
enforcing green policies, the main idea is that a more stringent regulation is positively associated with higher environmental 
efficiency. In terms of growth rates, it follows from Eq. (7) that: 
Z t − Z t−1 
Z t−1 
= fλt−1 (8) 
which is expressed as a function of λ. 
As a simplifying hypothesis, suppose policy makers’ attitudes towards the environment perfectly match those of citizens. 
In this way, environmental regulation mirrors aggregate sentiments: 
λt = t (9) 
This assumption does not come without an important cost given that such a utopian democracy does not really exist. For
instance, several people are simply disenfranchised or do not care about the environment or politics. Future research should 
take into account these aspects and provide a more accurate description of power distribution in society. In any case, the
approach adopted here is convenient from an operational point of view while preserving the main message of our contribu- 
tion. Policy makers might not perfectly match society’s expectations, but there must be some degree of adherence between 
them. 
The outcome of an election somehow reflects the will of the majority of citizens and determines, among other things, the
new policy guidelines on environmental risks. This, in turn, impacts the level of regulation stringency. Recall that  ∈ [ −1 , 1] .
Hence, when most people support environmental policies,  > 0 , policy makers adopt a green agenda with λ > 0 . On the
other hand, when citizens oppose environmental-friendly policies,  < 0 , regulation is such that λ < 0 . Notice that an equal
distribution between the two groups,  = 0 , does not produce any regulation in the first place, λ = 0 . This is because none
of the two groups is strong enough to prevail. 
2.3. The production technology 
The last block of equations consists in the determination of the supply side of the economy. Consider a production 
technology that combines energy, E, and labour. Following a long tradition in ecological economics, factors of production 
are complements rather than substitutes: 




; q t Ne t 
} 
(10) 
where ϑ is the energy-output ratio, q stands for labour productivity and e = L/N, with L indicating the level of employment.
Labour productivity is defined as q = Y/L . 
Given the Leontief dynamic efficiency condition, we have as a good approximation that output depends on the demand 
for energy by firms while the employment rate adjust to production: 
Y t − Y t−1 
Y t−1 
= E t − E t−1 
E t−1 
− ϑ t − ϑ t−1 
ϑ t−1 
(11) 
e t − e t−1 
e t−1 
= Y t − Y t−1 
Y t−1 
− q t − q t−1 
q t−1 
(12) 
The first expression indicates that the use of energy goes pari passu with the rate of growth of output. On the other hand,
the employment rate adjusts to the difference between output and labour productivity growth rates. When the former is 
growing faster than the latter, there is disequilibrium in the labour market and the employment rate increases. Therefore, 
to recover the so-called natural rate of growth the labour market must be in equilibrium. 3 
Scholars in the field recognise that the amount of energy required in production is sensitive to the environmental effi- 
ciency of current technologies. Thus, an increase in the rate of growth of Z is associated with a lower energy-output ratio.
This implies that as the amount of GHG emissions per unit of output decreases, there is a proportional reduction in emis-
sions per kg equivalent of energy use. Cleaner technologies are characterised by a more efficient use of resources: 








where b > 0 stands for the respective elasticity. If there are no changes in environmental efficiency, ϑ will remain constant.3 In continuous time, Eqs. (11) and (12) directly follow from taking log-derivatives of the Leontief efficiency condition. However, in discrete time, the rate 
of growth of the product of two variables is equal to the sum of the rates of growth of each variable plus their product. Still, because of the very small 
magnitude of this last term, we disregard it for the sake of simplicity. Analogously, hereafter, we shall take the rate of growth of the ratio of two variables 
as the difference between the rate of growth of each of them. 
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Suppose firms’ energy needs grow at an exogenous rate, a , given by the prevailing technological paradigm. Inserting 
Eq. (13) into Eq. (11) , the rate of growth of output can be disaggregated between an autonomous and an efficiency compo-
nent: 
Y t − Y t−1 
Y t−1 
= a + b 
(




such that the adoption of green-technologies leads to higher growth. This follows from the fact that the level of output
compatible with an efficient use of energy inputs has increased. 
By substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (8) and the resulting expression into Eq. (14) , we obtain the rate of growth of output in
terms of aggregate attitudes towards the environment: 
Y t − Y t−1 
Y t−1 
= a + b ft−1 (15) 
A well-designed environmental regulation is associated with a higher f , leading to the adoption of more environmentally 
friendly production arrangements. Moreover, b reflects the capacity of the productive structure to translate this increase in 
efficiency into greater competitiveness. We refer to b f as the intensity of PH. When the majority of the population supports 
climate policies one should expect a higher rate of growth because a more stringent environmental regulation was supposed 
to increase efficiency in the use of energy resources. 
Finally, labour productivity is a central issue in economics and has been studied using both more conventional as well 
as alternative approaches (for a review see Tavani and Zamparelli, 2017 . Keeping the exercise as simple as possible, in this
representation, we want to highlight the role of two main mechanisms: dynamic economies of scale and induced technical 
change. Both can be directly linked to what is happening in the labour market, which is quite convenient for our narrative. 
On the one hand, it is widely acknowledged by the profession that to a large extent technical progress is embodied in
new machinery and equipment ( Arrow, 1962 ; Romero and Britto, 2017 ). More recently, with the rise of intangible assets,
one could think of innovation that comes in the form of new software and algorithms. In any case, labour must be in
use for productivity gains to be effectively incorporated. Otherwise, there is just a “beautiful” creation with no impact on 
production. On the other hand, some empirical evidence indicates that factor productivity growth rates respond to factor 
cost-shares ( Acemoglu, 2003 ; Dávila-Fernández, 2020 ). The idea is that, when employment rates are high, there is an in-
crease in the bargaining power of workers that might be able to obtain higher wages relative to labour productivity. Firms
respond by increasing their search for labour saving production techniques, thus increasing q . Formally, we have: 
q t − q t−1 
q t−1 
= −c + ge t−1 (16) 
where c > 0 is an arbitrary constant and g > 0 captures the response of productivity to the employment rate. Hence, high
employment rates are associated with strong increases in labour productivity. 
2.4. Dynamic system 
Substituting Eqs. (15) and (16) into Eq. (12) , we obtain the dynamic relationship governing changes in the employment
rate. On the other hand, substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) , the result is that attitudes towards climate policies depend on the
employment rate and on the confirmation bias . Our 2-dimensional map is given by: 
e t = ( 1 + a + b ft−1 + c − ge t−1 ) e t−1 
(17) 




















e t −e t−1 
e t−1 












e t −e t−1 
e t−1 
)) − t−1 
] 
In steady-state, e t = e t−1 and t = t−1 . The equilibrium conditions are such that: 
a = −c + ge 
 = 0 
A stable rate of employment depends on the economy growing at the same pace as labour productivity. Moreover, environ- 
mental attitudes come to a state of rest when there is an equalisation between the probability of supporting and opposing
climate policies. It is possible to say in advance that this will only occur when agents are split in equal proportions. 
We can now state and prove the following Proposition regarding the existence of a unique non-trivial equilibrium point. 
Proposition 1. The dynamic system (17) has a unique non-trivial equilibrium solution, P 1 = (e ∗1 , ∗1 ) , defined and given by: 
e ∗1 = 
c + a 
g 
(18) 
∗1 = 0 572 













Proof. See Mathematical Appendix A1 . 
Recall that the sentiments index only responds to changes in the rate of employment. This implies that, in equilibrium,
the population is polarised and equally distributed between ecological positions. Aggregate attitudes are, thus, indepen- 
dent of any sort of confirmatory bias. Given the lack of social consensus regarding the environmental challenge, society 
is incapable of producing meaningful environmental policies. As a result, things remain the way they are, at least from a
macroeconomic point of view. 
On the other hand, the rate of employment only depends on energy used and on labour-productivity-related parameters. 
For instance, an increase in the autonomous component of energy requirements, a , is associated with an increase in the
long-run rate of growth. In order to produce more, firms hire more workers, increasing the employment rate. Still, notice 
that if firms strongly increase their search for labour saving production techniques as a reaction to high employment rates, 
one should expect a lower e ∗1 . Such results are independent of ecological variables because 
∗
1 = 0 , thus implying that, in
equilibrium, λ = 0 . 
Regarding the local stability of P 1 , we can state and prove the following Proposition: 
Proposition 2. The equilibrium point P 1 is locally asymptotically stable in the region of the parameter space defined as: 
ge ∗1 + ( 1 − ge ∗1 ) α − αb fβ > 0 
A violation of this condition is associated with the occurrence of a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. 
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix A2 . 
While we rule out the possibility of a flip or a fold bifurcation, the system admits a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. 4 This
comes with an important economic result, namely, the emergence of endogenous and persistent cycles in public opinion 
related to current macroeconomic conditions. They should be interpreted as long-run dynamics linked to processes of in- 
stitutional and structural change, not to be confused with short-term business cycles. Using the response of sentiments to 
changes in employment, β , as a bifurcation parameter, we have that beyond a critical value: 
βNS = 






βNS = + ∞ 
lim 
α→ 1 
βNS = 1 
b f 
the dynamic system admits a family of periodic solutions. 
The expression above establishes a direct connection between the existence of a periodic attractor and the degree of 
confirmatory bias. In fact, as α approaches zero, that is, as agents are fully biased, βNS goes to infinity, basically implying
the stability of the internal equilibrium point. That is precisely one of the evolutionary justifications for the existence of 
such cognitive mechanism in human reasoning: by introducing an inertial component at the individual level, it increases the 
predictability of the system. However, as the confirmation bias falls, βNS converges to a constant, which in turn is inversely
related to the strength of PH. In our model, f captures the response of environmental efficiency to regulation while b stands 
as the elasticity of the energy-output ratio. The higher is their product, the more likely it is that persistent and periodic
fluctuations will arise. 
Proposition 2 leaves us in the dark regarding the stability of the bifurcation. To provide a more concrete view of its
properties and the economic intuition behind our narrative of cycles in public opinion, it is useful to turn our attention to
numerical analysis. 
2.5. Numerical simulations 
We choose parameter values such as to obtain results that are economically meaningful. This selection, nonetheless, has 
only an illustrative purpose. Similar qualitative dynamics can be obtained for a wider range of values. We rely on well-
known macroeconomic regularities and evidence provided by Romero and Britto, 2017 , Tavani and Zamparelli (2017) , and 
Mealy and Teytelboym (2020) . However, given that we are not calibrating a “real” economy, their studies were only used to
give an idea of the magnitudes involved. Our reference values are: 
a = 0 . 03 , b = 0 . 1 , f = 0 . 1 , c = 0 . 06 , g = 0 . 1 4 In a dynamic system, when the modulus of a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues is equal to one, a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs. Its similarities 
with the Hopf bifurcation are obvious, but we would like to emphasise an important difference. While the invariant limit cycle in the latter case consists 
of a single orbit, in the former case it is an invariant set on which there exist many different orbits (see Medio and Lines, 2003 , p. 159). The emerging 
periodic orbit might be stable or unstable. In the first situation, we say the bifurcation is super-critical, while in the second we refer to a sub-critical 
bifurcation. 
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α = 0 . 25 
such that, in every period, 75% of agents do not change their views on environmental regulation. 
As mentioned in our previous discussion, an important parameter capturing the interaction between attitudes towards 
climate policies and the economy is β . Fig. 1 reports the 1D bifurcation diagrams for e ∗1 and 
∗
1 and the Maximum Lyapunov
Exponent (MLE) with β varying from 100 to 200. 5 As employment conditions become increasingly important when forming 
an opinion about climate change, the unique non-trivial equilibrium point loses stability and a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation 
occurs. An equilibrium set still might exist because an attracting invariant closed curve coexists with the unstable fixed 
point. The orbits that result are a combination of points whose motion is either periodic or quasi-periodic. This is confirmed
by a MLE that oscillates slightly above and below zero. 
Fig. 2 depicts a periodic orbit in the (e, ) plane when β = 150 . The cycle is clock-wise oriented and results from the
interaction between two main forces. During good times, when the economy is growing, firms hire more workers, increasing 
the rate of employment. Consequently, agents’ basic needs are fulfilled and they become more inclined to accept environ- 
mental challenge. As attitudes towards climate policies become more favourable, policy makers are able to implement a 
more stringent environmental regulation, thus increasing efficiency through PH. There is an immediate reduction in energy- 
output ratios, resulting in higher output. This reinforces the initial impulse: 
Y ↑⇒ e ↑⇒  ↑⇒ Z ↑⇒ ϑ ↓⇒ Y ↑ 
Such an unstable force is counterbalanced by the interaction between technical change and the labour market. An in- 
crease in the rate of growth of output results in firms demanding more labour only up to certain point. This happens for
two reasons. First, while technical change is to a large extent capital embodied, workers must be using the new machinery
and equipment in order for productivity gains to be effectively incorporated. Second, as unemployment rates fall, a shortage 
of workers increases their bargaining power leading in some cases to real-wages growing above the rate of growth of labour
productivity. In both situations, firms respond by increasing their search for labour saving production techniques. As the rate 
of growth of labour productivity recovers, there is a reduction in the rate of employment: 
e ↑⇒ q ↑⇒ e ↓ 
5 The MLE is a prominent measure for stability evaluation in dynamic systems. It describes the phase speed at which two different points approach or 
depart. For each dimension of the system, a Lyapunov exponent exists forming the Lyapunov spectrum. A positive MLE is usually taken as an indication 
that the system is chaotic. In our simulations, we set the number of pre-interates to 150 0 0 and then considered 10 0 0 interactions in Fig. 1 and 50 0 0 
interactions in Fig. 3. 
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We thus have a representation in which endogenous cycles arise from the interaction between attitudes and the 
(macro)economy in line with the findings of Scruggs and Benegal (2012) and Shum (2012) , among others. They have shown
that during recessions, attitudes towards climate change in Europe and in the United States have become significantly less 
environmentally-friendly. While our results should be interpreted as long-run waves, the main message remains the same: 
not only are people’s sentiments influenced by the state of the economy, but fluctuations are an intrinsic property of this
relationship. This result is conditioned by the intensity of the confirmation bias which has proved to be a crucial element
behind the dynamics we obtained. 
3. Introducing a “group effect”
The model developed in the previous Section provides a formalisation of the interplay between attitudes towards climate 
policies and the economic system. However, an important element has been overlooked, that is, the fact that sentiments are 
to a large extent context dependent. People do not form their opinions and worldviews in a vacuum. In fact, agents are influ-
enced by the viewpoints of those surrounding them (e.g. Antoci et al., 2018 ). Scholars such as Kahan et al., 2009 have shown
that individuals form perceptions and opinions influenced by the values of the group with which they identify themselves 
(see also Hart et al., 2011 ; Efferson et al., 2020 ). 
As far as climate change is concerned, researchers such as Hart (2011) have shown that people tend to support more
environmental policies when exposed to a thematic frame than when exposed to an episodic frame. This evidence rein- 
forces the idea that motivated reasoning at the individual level depends on aggregate attitudes at the collective level, while 
obviously the latter are a function of the former. In the real world, it is impossible to separate them from each other and
our model should be compatible with this attribute. 
Dávila-Fernández (2020) demonstrated that such a “group effect” is responsible for generating the coexistence of a basin 
of attraction in which the majority of the population supports environmental regulation and another in which most agents 
have the opposite attitude. Abstracting from this last element has allowed us, in the previous Section, to identify in a
clear way that the interaction between employment conditions and the confirmation bias is the main source of endogenous 
cyclical trajectories. It is our intention to evaluate the robustness of this result with respect to a more realistic specification
of the probability functions. We proceed by modifying them as follows: 










































e t −e t−1 
e t−1 
))
where μ > 0 captures the strength of the “group effect”. 
The first expression indicates that the greater the share of the population that believes in climate change and supports 
environmental regulation, the greater the probability of adopting a favourable attitude. The opposite case also holds. If 
the majority of individuals oppose climate policies, this increases p −. For values of μ close to zero, individuals pay little
attention to the collective opinion. On the other hand, a strong “group effect” is associated with a greater interaction and 
influence between agents. 575 











3.1. Dynamic system 
Our new dynamic system is a 2-dimensional nonlinear map similar to (17) . The only difference lies in the probability
functions that now are given by Eq. (20) . We continue to have the interaction between different attitudes and the rest of
the economy but there is an extra inertial component in the former that is given by the so-called “group effect”: 
e t = ( 1 + a + b ft−1 + c − ge t−1 ) e t−1 
(21) 










































e t −e t−1 
e t−1 
)) − t−1 
] 
In steady-state, the equilibrium conditions are such that: 
a + b f = −c + ge 
(22) 
 = tanh ( μ) 
Contrary to the previous case, it is not possible to say in advance if the steady-state requires or not an equal division of
the population between the two groups. As expected, the hyperbolic tangent function opens the door to the possibility of 
multiple equilibria, which can be appreciated by stating and proving the following Proposition: 
Proposition 3. When the “group effect” is weak enough, μ ≤ 1 , the dynamic system has a unique non-trivial equilibrium solution 
that satisfies (18) . On the other hand, when μ > 1 , the dynamic system has two additional equilibrium solutions with a positive
employment rate, P 2 = (e ∗2 , ∗2 ) and P 3 = (e ∗3 , ∗3 ) , that satisfy: 
e ∗i = 
c + a + b f∗
i 
g 




where i = [1 , 2] while ∗
2 
> 0 and ∗
3 
< 0 . 
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix A3 . 
A weak interaction between agents leads to a unique equilibrium point in which the population is equally divided be- 
tween those who support and those who oppose climate policies. At the threshold μ = 1 , however, a Pitchfork bifurcation
occurs and the system transitions from one to three fixed points. The two additional non-trivial equilibrium solutions are 
such that the majority of the population either believes in or is skeptical of the environmental challenge. In the first case,
the adoption of a more stringent regulation leads to a higher rate of employment. On the contrary, in the second case, given
that most individuals do not support the adoption of climate policies, there is a reduction in energy efficiency that harms
output. As a result, the rate of growth of the economy is reduced, leading to lower employment rates. 
Since the most interesting case occurs when there is sufficient interaction between agents, we will limit the remainder 
of our analysis to the case in which μ > 1 . Regarding the stability of equilibrium solutions, we can state and prove the
following Proposition: 
Proposition 4. When the group effect is strong enough, μ > 1 , the equilibrium P 1 is a saddle point, while P 2 and P 3 are locally
asymptotically stable in the region of the parameter space defined as: 





1 − ge ∗
i 
) + 2 b fe ∗i θ+ e 
1 − ge ∗
i 
− 2 θ+  > 0 
where 
θ+ e = −θ−e = −2 gβκ
























The violation of this condition is associated with the occurrence of a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. 576 
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Proof. See Mathematical Appendix A4 . 
Propositions 2 and 4 are equivalent in terms of their economic content. Both fundamentally highlight the emergence 
of endogenous waves in public opinion that interact with the rest of the economy in a persistent way. Taking β as the
controlling parameter, a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs when: 
βNS = 
α( 1 − 4 μκ) 
(














( 1 − 4 μκ) 
(





4 κb f 
In the case in which there is no “group-effect”, μ = 0 , it is easy to see that Eq. (23) collapses into (19) . The correspon-
dence with the confirmation bias is also the same. If the bias is maximum, the bifurcation parameter goes to infinity and
the system is stable. This is an interesting result because, as explained in Section 2 , it provides an evolutionary justification
for the existence of the bias. Notice, nonetheless, that if a society is in the “bad” equilibrium, a higher bias makes it more
difficult to change. The magnitude of α does not affect the equilibrium values but plays a decisive role in their local stability
properties. 
Two relevant questions remain to be answered. The first is related to the boundaries between basins of attraction when 
β < βNS . This is important because it indicates how difficult it is to move from the “bad” equilibrium to the “good” one. The
second question concerns the case in which β ≥ βNS . Given that the dynamic system admits multiple equilibrium solutions, 
we might have a unique cycle or the coexistence of periodic attractors. The latter stands as a representation of path depen-
dence since, depending on initial conditions, many different orbits around different equilibrium points can potentially exist. 
We shall investigate both issues by means of numerical simulations. 6 
3.2. Numerical simulations 
Maintaining the calibration parameters chosen in the previous Section, we still have to determine the intensity of the 
“group effect”. Fig. 3 shows the transition from one fixed point to three fixed points when μ ≷ 1 . The green line corresponds
to P 2 and indicates the case in which the majority of the population supports climate change mitigation policies. The red
line stands for the alternative scenario, P 3 , and delivers a rate of employment Pareto inferior. The identification of two
different attractors raises concerns about the set of initial conditions that approaches each of them. The qualitative behavior 
of the long-run motion of a given system can be fundamentally different depending on which basin of attraction the initial
condition lies in. 6 In a very broad perspective, a dynamic system displays path dependence when, after a period of transition, the time-trajectories of its variables are 
sensible to initial conditions. The very notion of multiple paths ultimately rests on the idea that history is an essential part of dynamic phenomena (see 
Dosi et al., 2018 ). 
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In the remaining of the paper, we suppose as a baseline scenario: 
μ = 1 . 025 
With the chosen values for the parameters, the two additional equilibrium points are such that P 2 = (0 . 9268 , 0 . 26) and
P 3 = (0 . 8732 , −0 . 26) . Fig. 4 presents their basins of attraction when β < βNS . In green, we have all initial conditions that
converge to the more desirable state with favourable attitudes, less GHG emissions, and higher growth, P 2 . In red, it is
possible to appreciate the basin of attraction of the opposite case, P 3 . 
The stable manifold of the saddle P 1 determines the separatrix between the two locally stable equilibrium solutions, and 
one should notice that such a boundary is a function of β . When β = 0 , attitudes towards climate policies are independent
from macroeconomic conditions. In this case, the green and red areas are separated by a straight horizontal line such that
 = 0 . On the other hand, the story changes for β > 0 . Given that e ∗
i 
is relatively close to 1, this means that for most initial
conditions in the (e, ) space, the rate of employment will be increasing as the system converges towards equilibrium. From
Eq. (6) it follows that p + > p −, justifying the asymmetric behaviour observed in Fig. 4 . For similar reasons, a relatively high
employment rate and negative or just slightly positive attitudes are associated with convergence to the “bad” equilibrium. 
Indeed, under the current calibration, most initial conditions lead to the “good” equilibrium point. At first, this result 
might sound counter-intuitive because a falling e increases the probability of opposing environmental regulation. Notice, 
however, that it is not the level of the employment rate that matters but the direction of change. Very low employment rates
will inevitably converge to a higher equilibrium rate. In this process, e t > e t−1 , thus giving impulse to positive attitudes and
enlarging the basins of attraction of the green equilibrium point. As we increase the response of sentiments to employment 
conditions, the green region expands while the red area narrows. 
Increasing the response of sentiments to the rate of employment eventually leads to a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation . The 
equilibrium points P 2 and P 3 become unstable and a periodic orbit emerges. Still, since βNS depends on e 
∗
i 
, this does not
happen simultaneously. Fig. 5 reports the respective 1D bifurcation diagram. Persistent fluctuations first arise around the 
anti-environment position and only later around the pro-environment solution. For values of β beyond a critical point, the 
limit cycle loses its stability and an attracting torus is born including both states. In fact, the MLE is very similar to the one
reported in the previous Section. 7 
Fig. 6 presents the clockwise cycles in the (e, ) plane. In diagram (a), we chose a value slightly above the first bifurca-
tion threshold, β = 34 . 8 . For initial conditions very close to P 3 , there is convergence to a small orbit depicted in red. On the
other hand, initial conditions in the neighbourhood of P 2 continue to converge to the corresponding equilibrium point. In all
remaining cases, we have convergence to a larger orbit, in blue, that includes the three equilibria. In panel (b), with a higher
β , the red orbit enlarges and merges with the blue one. When β = 39 . 4 , the second equilibrium point, P 2 , loses stability and
we have a cycle around the green-growth solution. The coexistence of periodic attractors stands as a representation of path 
dependence in which different initial conditions are associated with different trajectories. Further increasing β results in 
the fusion of the green orbit with the red one. At this point, we obtain a unique cycle that includes all three equilibrium
points. The size of the area inside the cycle depends on the response of sentiments to labour market conditions. Panels (c)7 As indicated by one of the reviewers, the MLE is sensitive to initial conditions. Hence, in Fig. 5 we report in green and red the correspondent MLE for 
initial conditions in the basin of attraction of P 2 and P 3 , respectively. Notice that the red lines reaches zero before the green one, in accordance with our 
1D bifurcation diagrams that show P 3 loses stability before P 2 . 
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Fig. 5. Bifurcation diagram and Max. Lyapunov Exponent when μ = 1 . 025 . 
Fig. 6. Emergence and coexistence of periodic attractors when (a) β = 42 . 4 , (b) β = 44 . 7 , (c) β = 50 , and (d) β = 100 . 
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and (d) indicate that doubling the value of β enlarges the cycle. It is possible to appreciate how colours overlap in a unique
clockwise motion orbit. 
The rationality of the resulting persistent and bounded fluctuations follows very closely the description presented in 
Section 2 . The interaction between employment and labour productivity plays a stabilising role given that firms respond to 
increases in employment by increasing their search for labour saving production techniques, which in turn reduces e . For 
the cycle to emerge, a destabilising force is necessary, which in our case comes from the interaction between employment 
dynamics with sentiments and environmental efficiency. An increase in the employment rate is related to a higher prob- 
ability of adopting favourable attitudes towards climate policies. Through PH, this implies higher environmental efficiency, 
resulting in an increase in production and, consequently, in higher employment rates. 
There are, however, important differences with the system presented in the first part of the paper. The most evident 
concerns the coexistence of periodic orbits. A less obvious difference is related to the magnitude of βNS . In Fig. 1 , it is
possible to see that, in the first model, a value of β ≈ 130 was required for the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation to occur. Without
modifying our choice of parameters, Fig. 4 shows that, in the second case, a similar result can be obtained when β ≈ 45 .
The introduction of the “group effect” implies the addition of another source of inertia – besides the confirmation bias – at 
the collective level. This increases the strength of the destabilising force in the system, thus reducing the magnitude of β
required for the bifurcation to occur. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Psychologists among other behavioural scientists refer to confirmation bias as one of the most problematic aspects of 
human reasoning. It can cause serious issues in different contexts. When it comes to climate change, the tendency to favour
information that supports one’s prior beliefs increases the difficulty of tackling the environmental challenge. Moreover, po- 
larisation of opinions might be dangerous because successful policy implementation requires a certain degree of acceptance 
capable of delivering sustainable long-run results. 
This paper developed a small-scale agent-based model to investigate how employment conditions affect attitudes towards 
climate policies under such a cognitive bias. We showed that endogenous fluctuations might emerge in the form of a super-
critical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. The system admits the coexistence of periodic attractors depending on the individual’s 
response to the so-called “group effect”. The emerging cycle is the outcome of the interaction between a stable and an
unstable force. On the one hand, the former is related to induced-technical change. On the other hand, the latter refers to
the positive response of environmental sentiments to the rate of employment. 
In terms of policy implications, we highlight that the adoption of a successful green-agenda depends on the ability of 
policy makers to take advantage of favourable employment rates while appealing to different framing strategies. This last 
result is in line with studies indicating that bias effects might be countered by focusing on the gains of climate change mit-
igation. In addition, more important than the level of the employment rate, our analysis suggests that policy makers should 
act when employment is increasing. The obtained cycles should be interpreted as long-run dynamics linked to processes 
of institutional and structural change. Still, if successfully tamed, they may actually be the path towards a more desirable 
green-equilibrium. 
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Appendix A. Mathematical Appendix 
A1. Proof of Proposition 1 
The equilibrium conditions of the dynamic system (17) are given by: 
a = −c + ge 
 = 0 580 
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Rearranging the first expression, it immediately follows that: 
e ∗1 = 
c + a 
g 
E 1 = 0 
is the unique non-trivial equilibrium point. 
A2. Proof of Proposition 2 
In order to prove Proposition 2 , we need to compute the partial derivatives of the probability functions with respect to
the employment rate and to environmental attitudes. Define an auxiliary variable, s , as given by: 
s t−1 = e t − e t−1 
e t−1 




The probability of supporting the environment is such that: 
p + t−1 = 
exp ( βs t−1 ) 
exp ( βs t−1 ) + exp ( −βs t−1 ) 






exp ( βs t−1 ) [ exp ( βs t−1 ) + exp ( −βs t−1 ) ] 





exp ( βs t−1 ) − β ∂s ∂e t−1 exp ( −βs t−1 ) 
]
exp ( βs t−1 ) 
[ exp ( βs t−1 ) + exp ( −βs t−1 ) ] 2 












In turn, the probability of opposing climate policies is given by: 
p −t−1 = 
exp ( −γ s t−1 ) 







exp ( −γ s t−1 ) [ exp ( −γ s t−1 ) + exp ( γ s t−1 ) ] 





exp ( −γ s t−1 ) + γ ∂s ∂e t−1 exp ( γ s t−1 ) 
]
exp ( −γ s t−1 ) 










= γ g 
2 
> 0 
On the other hand, the derivative of s with respect to attitudes is such that: 
∂s t−1 
∂t−1 
= b f 
Thus, we can compute: 
p + t−1 = 
exp ( βs t−1 ) 
exp ( βs t−1 ) + exp ( −βs t−1 ) 






exp ( βs t−1 ) [ exp ( βs t−1 ) + exp ( −βs t−1 ) ] 





exp ( βs t−1 ) − β ∂s ∂t−1 exp ( −βs t−1 ) 
]
exp ( βs t−1 ) 
[ exp ( βs t−1 ) + exp ( −βs t−1 ) ] 2 









= βb f 
2 
> 0 t−1 
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while the probability of opposing climate policies is such that: 
p −t−1 = 
exp ( −γ s t−1 ) 







exp ( −γ s t−1 ) [ exp ( −γ s t−1 ) + exp ( γ s t−1 ) ] 





exp ( −γ s t−1 ) + γ ∂s ∂t−1 exp ( γ s t−1 ) 
]
exp ( −γ s t−1 ) 










= −γ b f 
2 
< 0 
We are now ready to compute the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (17) , which is defined and given by: 
J = 
[
1 − ge b fe 
−αgβ 1 − α + αb fβ
]
The coefficients of the characteristic equation are equal to: 
C 1 = −tr J 
= −1 + ge − 1 + α − αb fβ
= −2 + ge + α − αb fβ
C 2 = det J 
= ( 1 − ge ) [ 1 − α + αb fβ] + αb fβge 
= ( 1 − ge ) ( 1 − α) + αb fβ
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the local stability of a given equilibrium point require that all eigenvalues of 
the Jacobian matrix, determined as roots of the characteristic equation, are less than unity in modulus: 
1 + C 1 + C 2 > 0 
1 − C 1 + C 2 > 0 
1 − C 2 > 0 
Through direct computation, we find that: 
1 + C 1 + C 2 
= 1 − 2 + ge + α − αb fβ + ( 1 − ge ) ( 1 − α) + αb fβ
= αge > 0 
while 
1 − C 1 + C 2 
= 1 + 2 − ge − α + αb fβ + ( 1 − ge ) ( 1 − α) + αb fβ
= 2 αb fβ + ( 2 − ge ) ( 2 − α) > 0 
This means that the first two conditions are always satisfied and we rule out the possibility of fold and flip bifurcations,
respectively. The former is a local bifurcation in which two equilibrium points - one stable and one unstable - of a dynamical
system collide and annihilate each other. The latter occurs when a slight change in a system’s parameters causes a new
periodic trajectory to emerge from an existing periodic trajectory, the new one having double the period of the original. With
the doubled period, it takes twice as many iterations for the numerical values visited by the system to repeat themselves
(for a rigorous assessment, see Kuznetsov, 2004 ). 
Regarding the final condition: 
1 − C 2 
= ge + ( 1 − ge ) α − αb fβ  0 
Taking β = βNS as bifurcation parameter, we have that: 
βNS = ge + ( 1 − ge ) α
αb f 
For values of β ≥ βNS the equilibrium point loses stability and a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs. It corresponds to the 
birth of a closed curve from an equilibrium point in a discrete dynamic system. The bifurcation can be stable or unstable.
Our numerical simulations show that in our case the emerging cycle is stable. 582 




A3. Proof of Proposition 3 
The equilibrium conditions of the dynamic system (21) are given by: 
a + b f = −c + ge 
 = tanh ( μ) 
From the properties of the hyperbolic tangent function, we know that, when μ ≤ 1 , the second expression will be satisfied
iff  = 0 . In this case, we have: 
e ∗1 = 
c + a 
g 
E 1 = 0 
as the unique nontrivial equilibrium solution. 
On the other hand, when μ > 1 , from the properties of the hyperbolic tangent function, we know there are two addi-
tional values of  that satisfy the second equilibrium condition. Accordingly, rearranging the first equation, the other two 
equilibrium points are such that: 
e ∗i = 
c + a + b f∗
i 
g 




where i = [1 , 2] while ∗2 > 0 and ∗3 < 0 . 
A4. Proof of Proposition 4 
In order to prove Proposition 4 , we need to compute the partial derivatives of the probability functions with respect to
the employment rate and to environmental attitudes. Define an auxiliary variable, s , as given by: 
s t−1 = e t − e t−1 
e t−1 




Through direct computation, notice that: 
p + t−1 = 
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) 
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) 






exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) [ exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) ] 





exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) − β ∂s ∂e t−1 exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) 
]
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) 
[ exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) ] 2 




e t = e t−1 
= 
2 β ∂s 
∂e t−1 
exp ( μt−1 ) exp ( −μt−1 ) 
[ exp ( μt−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 ) ] 2 
= θ+ e < 0 
while 
p −t−1 = 
exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) 







exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) [ exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) + exp ( μt−1 + γ s t−1 ) ] 





exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) + γ ∂s ∂e t−1 exp ( μt−1 + γ s t−1 ) 
]
exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) 





e t = e t−1 
= 
−2 γ ∂s 
∂e t−1 
exp ( μt−1 ) exp ( −μt−1 ) 
[ exp ( −μt−1 ) + exp ( μt−1 ) ] 2 
= θ−e > 0 
On the other hand, the derivative of s with respect to attitudes is such that: 
∂s t−1 
∂t−1 
= b f 583 
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p + t−1 = 
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) 
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) 





μ + β ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) [ exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) ] 
[ exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) ] 2 
−
[(
μ + β ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) −
(
μ + β ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) 
]
exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) 
[ exp ( μt−1 + βs t−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 − βs t−1 ) ] 2 








μ + β ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( μt−1 ) exp ( −μt−1 ) 
[ exp ( μt−1 ) + exp ( −μt−1 ) ] 2 
= θ+  > 0 
while the probability of having a negative attitude is such that: 
p −t−1 = 
exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) 






−μ − γ ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) [ exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) + exp ( μt−1 + γ s t−1 ) ] 
[ exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) + exp ( μt−1 + γ s t−1 ) ] 2 
−
[(
−μ − γ ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( −μt−1 − γ s t−1 ) + 
(
μ + γ ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( μt−1 + γ s t−1 ) 
]
exp ( −γ s t−1 ) 









μ + γ ∂s 
∂t−1 
)
exp ( −μt−1 ) exp ( μt−1 ) 
[ exp ( −μt−1 ) + exp ( μt−1 ) ] 2 
= θ− < 0 
We are now ready to compute the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (21) , which is defined and given by: 
J = 
⎡ 
⎣ 1 − ge b fe α(θ+ e − θ−e )︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
< 0 
1 − α + α
(
θ+  − θ−




The coefficients of the characteristic equation are: 
C 1 = −tr J 
= −1 + ge − 1 + α − α
(
θ+  − θ−
)
= −2 + ge + α − α
(
θ+  − θ−
)
C 2 = det J 
= ( 1 − ge ) 
[
1 − α + α
(




θ+ e − θ−e 
)
b fe 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the local stability of a given equilibrium point require that all eigenvalues of 
the Jacobian matrix, determined as roots of the characteristic equation, are less than unity in modulus: 
1 + C 1 + C 2 > 0 
1 − C 1 + C 2 > 0 
1 − C 2 > 0 
Through direct computation, we find that: 
1 + C 1 + C 2 
= 1 − 2 + ge + α − α
(
θ+  − θ−
)
+ ( 1 − ge ) 
[
1 − α + α
(




θ+ e − θ−e 
)
b fe 
= αge − geα
(




θ+ e − θ−e 
)
b fe > 0 
and 
1 − C 1 + C 2 
= 1 + 2 − ge − α + α
(
θ+  − θ−
)
+ ( 1 − ge ) 
[
1 − α + α
(









θ+  − θ−
)
+ ( 2 − α) ( 2 − ge ) + α
(
θ+  − θ−
)
( 1 − ge ) − α
(
θ+ e − θ−e 
)
b fe > 0 
implying that the first two conditions are always satisfied. 584 
















Regarding the last one, we have: 
1 − C 2 
= 1 − ( 1 − ge ) 
[
1 − α + α
(




θ+ e − θ−e 
)
b fe 
= 1 − ( 1 − α) ( 1 − ge ) − α
(
θ+  − θ−
)
( 1 − ge ) + α
(
θ+ e − θ−e 
)
b fe  0 
Notice that θ+ e = −θ−e and θ+  = −θ− . Hence, the expression above will be positive as long as: 
2 θ+  = 1 + 
ge 
α( 1 − ge ) + 
2 b feθ+ e 
1 − ge (A.1) 
If a change in one of the parameters determines the violation of this last condition, a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs. 
Define: 
κ = exp ( −μt−1 ) exp ( μt−1 ) 
[ exp ( −μt−1 ) + exp ( μt−1 ) ] 2 
(A.2) 
Substitute Eq. (A.2) into the definitions of θ+ e and θ
+ 

. Insert the resulting expressions into Eq. (A.1) .Taking β as our bifurca-
tion parameter in the resulting expression, we have that the system admits a family of periodic solutions when: 
β ≥ α( 1 − 4 μκ) ( 1 − ge ) + ge 
4 καb f 
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